The sortal dependence of demonstrative reference by Dickie, Imogen
 1 
The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference 
Imogen Dickie 
 
Abstract - ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity 
to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. §1 distinguishes two sortalist views. §2 argues that 
one of them is false. §3 argues that the other is true. §4 uses the argument from §3 to develop a new response to the objection to 
sortalism from examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong, or do not attempt to 
classify at all.  
 
‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ (hereafter just ‘sortalism’) is the view 
that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them 
according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. The paper has four 
parts. §1 distinguishes two sortalist views. §2 argues that one of them is false. §3 argues 
that the other is true. §4 uses the argument for sortalism from §3 to develop a new response 
to an old and intuitive objection to sortalism – the objection from the claim that sortalism 
is disproved by examples where we succeed in referring even though we get sortal 
classification wrong, or do not (apparently) attempt to classify at all.  
I shall restrict the discussion to cases of ‘perceptual demonstrative reference’ – 
cases where you are in a position to refer to an object using ‘this’ or ‘that’ in virtue of a 
current perceptual link with it. I take these to be the central cases of demonstrative 
reference. There are hard questions about how what I say in this paper might extend to less 
central cases, for example, use of ‘this’ or ‘that’ to refer to something you remember, or to 
complex demonstrative reference (reference using terms like ‘that tree’ and ‘that dog’). But 
it is not possible to consider these questions here.  
  
§1 Appropriation Sortalism vs. Rich Referential Sortalism 
As a first step towards the distinction between sortalist views that I want to 
introduce, consider the following accounts of what it takes for a speaker to be using an 
expression to ‘refer to’ an object. 
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First (minimal) account:  S is using α to ‘refer to’ o (in a context) iff S’s intention, in using 
α in the context, is to mark o’s relevance to the conversation from S’s point of view. (For 
example, S may use α intending to greet o or to draw someone else’s attention to o; S may 
use α intending to indicate o as an object desired or sought; or S may combine α with other 
expressions intending to say something about o.)  
 
Second (rich) account
1
: S is using α to ‘refer to’ o (in a context) iff S’s intention, in using 
α in the context, is at least to introduce o for the rest of the sentence containing α to say 
something about.
 
 
 
(Note that this distinction between rich and minimal senses of ‘refer’ is a distinction at the 
level of ‘speaker’s referent’ as opposed to ‘semantic referent’. A token expression’s 
‘speaker’s referent’ is the object the speaker intends to be talking about in using it. A token 
expression’s ‘semantic referent’ is the object that the linguistic conventions associated with 
the expression together with relevant features of context determine as its contribution to 
whether the sentence containing it is true.
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 It is a familiar observation that speaker’s 
referent and semantic referent may be distinct. For example, suppose that you nod towards 
a man who looks like Russell and say ‘Bertrand Russell is paying the bill for the whole 
table’. Then the speaker’s referent for your token use of ‘Bertrand Russell’ is the man you 
are indicating, even though the semantic referent for your use of this term is Russell. My 
concern in this paper is with what kind of relation between speaker and object is required if 
the object is to be the speaker’s referent of a token perceptual demonstrative used by a 
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subject. Nothing I have to say here requires taking sides with respect to how possible 
divergences between speakers’ referential intentions and linguistic convention should be 
treated. Throughout the paper, ‘α refers to o’ should be read as ‘o is the speaker’s referent 
of α’.)  
Borrowing some terminology from the literature on complex demonstratives
3
, I 
shall say that there is an object ‘appropriated’ by S’s use of an expression iff as a result of 
this use the object is introduced as relevant to the conversation from S’s point of view. In 
these terms, the minimal account says that appropriation is both necessary and sufficient 
for reference, while the rich account says that appropriation is necessary but not sufficient 
for reference. According to the rich account, a use of α that appropriates o is a referring 
use iff it introduces o as the thing the proposition S intends to communicate
4
 is about.  
Given the two accounts of reference, and the notion of appropriation, the two 
sortalist views that I want to consider can be introduced like this: 
 
First sortalist view: ‘Appropriation sortalism’ – the view that the capacity to refer 
demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to appropriate 
objects depends on the capacity to classify them. 
 
Second sortalist view: ‘Rich referential sortalism’– the view that the capacity to 
appropriate objects does not depend on the capacity to classify  them, but the capacity to 
refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to use a 
demonstrative to say something about an object depends on the capacity to classify it.   
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If appropriation sortalism is true, even the capacity for minimal reference depends on the 
capacity to classify. If rich referential sortalism is true, the capacity for rich reference 
depends on the capacity to classify, but the capacity for minimal reference does not.
 
 
The next two sections argue that appropriation sortalism is false and rich referential 
sortalism is true. 
 
§2 Appropriation Sortalism is False
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Appropriation sortalism is the view that the capacity to refer demonstratively 
depends on the capacity to classify because the capacity to appropriate objects depends on 
the capacity to classify them.  I shall suppose that you are in a position to appropriate o iff 
you are in a position to attach an expression to o as intended referent, and that your 
perceptual processing puts you in a position to attach an expression to o as intended 
referent iff it presents you with o as a possible object of cognition – a thing that you might 
go on to have a thought about. Given these suppositions, appropriation sortalism stands or 
falls with the claim that our perceptual systems present us with particulars as possible 
objects of cognition only with the aid of our capacities for conceptual classification. And 
there is strong empirical evidence that this claim is false.  
The first part of this section sets out some of the relevant empirical evidence. The 
second considers in more detail how this evidence impacts on appropriation sortalism.  
The relevant empirical evidence concerns the nature of visual selective attention. 
‘Selective attention’ is the process by which a specific part of the visual field is highlighted 
as a part information from which is available for conceptual thought. For example, you can 
see a large number of words on this page. All the words you can see are in your visual 
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field.  But at each moment you will be able to tell what only a few of the words are. The 
words you are currently in a position to recognise are the ones you are currently attending 
to. Because what you are attending to determines which aspects of what is presented in 
your visual field you are in a position to think about, the processes involved in preparing 
the field over which attention roams, and in locking attention to one part of this field, are 
pre-conceptual. But psychologists have amassed strong evidence that visual selective 
attention is often directed to objects (in some sense of ‘object’). Since attention is the gate-
keeper for conceptual thought, this is evidence for the claim that our capacities to parse 
scenes into objects, and select particular objects as potential objects of thought, are pre-
conceptual too: if attention delivers up objects for conceptual thought, our perceptual 
processing can parse scenes into objects and lock onto specific objects before 
conceptualisation, and, in particular, classification under sortal concepts, come into play. 
Here is some of the evidence for the claim that attention is often directed at objects 
(in some sense of ‘object’) that psychologists have found.
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§2.1 First piece of evidence – the automatic spread of attention 
 
fig.1     fig.2 
(both from Scholl 2002; ‘C’ stands for ‘cue’; ‘S’ for ‘same rectangle’; ‘D’ for ‘different rectangle’) 
 
In a basic ‘automatic spread of attention’ experiment, subjects are presented with either 
two (fig.1) or three (fig. 2) rectangles arranged as shown. A spotlight is used to make a spot 
where the ‘C’ is. The spot disappears. Immediately afterwards there is a ‘luminance 
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decrement’ (a gradual darkening) either at the point marked ‘S’ or at the point marked ‘D’ 
(so either on the same rectangle as the initial cue or on a different rectangle). It turns out 
that we are much faster at detecting a decrement on the same rectangle as the initial cue 
than on a different rectangle. The effect cannot be caused by a difference in distance from 
the initial cue, because the ‘D’ and the ‘S’ are equidistant from the ‘C’. Rather, it seems 
that attention is attracted by the initial cue, then spreads out to the boundaries of the shape 
the cue is on. And attention is not just spreading until it hits a solid line on every side. For 
the effect remains in fig. 2 cases, where the rectangles where the action is taking place are 
partially occluded. Rather, the boundaries to which attention is spreading seem to be object 
boundaries – boundaries around one thing which is seen as lying behind another.
7
  
 
§2.2 Second piece of evidence  - amodal completion 
‘Amodal completion’ is the process by which shapes are completed into apparent 
objects. For example, consider fig. 3: 
 
fig. 3 (from Driver et. al 2002) 
When you look at fig. 3, your visual system completes the partially visible circle into a full 
circle that you see as lying behind an occluding square. Now consider fig. 4 and fig. 5. And 
suppose that in each case you are asked to find the notched circle.  
 
fig. 4 (from Driver et. al 2002) 
 7 
 
 
fig. 5 (from Driver et. al 2002) 
 
 
The notched circle is much harder to find in fig. 5 than in fig. 4. And it has been found that 
this gap between fig. 5 type cases and fig. 4 type cases increases with the number of 
distracters in the diagram. The more extra shapes are in the frame, the harder it is to find 
the target shape in a fig. 5 type case. In fig. 4 type cases the frame has to get really big (so 
that you cannot take it in at a glance) or the shapes have to get really small before the 
notched circle ceases to jump out at you. Psychologists have concluded that the reason the 
notched circle is harder to find in fig. 5 is that amodal completion is pre-attentive. When 
you look at fig. 4, your pre-attentive processing delivers a field which contains a notched 
circle. This notched circle can then grab your attentional spotlight as it goes by. In contrast, 
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when you look at fig. 5, your pre-attentive processing fills in the missing part of the 
notched circle. So the field over which your attention roams does not contain a notched 
circle. It contains a partially occluded full circle instead. To find the notched circle you 
have to attend to each shape in turn, looking to see if it contains a ‘hidden’ notched circle. 
That is why the target shape is so much harder to find in fig. 5 than in fig. 4, and why the 
gap increases with increasing numbers of distracters.
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But amodal completion is completion into objects: when you look at fig. 5, your 
visual system completes the notched circle into a full circle seen as lying behind a square. 
So if attention roams over a field in which amodal completion has already taken place, our 
pre-conceptual processing is delivering a world already divided into objects of some kind.  
 
§2.3 Third piece of evidence – multiple object tracking 
The final piece of empirical evidence I shall present concerns the relative efficiency 
of attentive and pre-attentive processing. It is generally accepted that pre-attentive 
processing is much more efficient than post-attentive processing. Sub-personal, pre-
attentive, information processing is fast and has enormous capacities. In contrast, our 
dealings with information after attention has selected it as available for conceptual thought 
are slow and have relatively small capacities. The more conceptual-level tasks you attempt 
at once, the slower you will get
9
. But parsing the visual field into objects seems to share 
the efficiency of pre-attentive processing. So parsing into objects seems to be pre-attentive.  
 The main experiments which have been taken to establish this result involve 
‘multiple object tracking’. In multiple object tracking experiments, subjects are shown a 
display containing a number of identical dots. Some dots are ‘flashed’ to distinguish them 
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from the others (a). The dots then move randomly around the display (b). When the motion 
stops the subject is asked to say whether a given dot flashed at the outset (c). 
(from Scholl 2002) 
If parsing into apparent objects were post-attentive (so cognition-involving), you would 
expect us to be much better at this task when asked to track only one than when asked to 
track two, and worse at tracking three than tracking two, and worse again at tracking four. 
But it turns out that our performance does not fall off in this way. We are as good at 
keeping track of two, three, or four things as we are at keeping track of one. At five the 
capacity seems to hit overload and beyond five it falls off suddenly. And this pattern of 
falling off –  uniform success up to some point at which the system’s capacity is reached – 
is the pattern characteristic of pre-attentive, not post-attentive, processing. So it seems that 
pre-attentive processing is already serving up a scene parsed into objects that we then 
attend to.
10
  
 
§2.4 The argument for the falsity of appropriation sortalism 
With this empirical evidence in place, the argument for the falsity of appropriation 
sortalism can be stated like this: 
 
1 Our pre-attentive perceptual processing parses the visual field into units (‘visual objects’) 
which attention selects as potential objects of thought. [Empirical claim] 
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2 Pre-attentive processing of perceptual input is pre-conceptual processing. [Consequence 
of the claim that what you are attending to determines what is available for conceptual 
thought.]  
 
3 Pre-conceptual processing does not depend on conceptual thought.  
 
4 Classifying objects according to their kinds (bringing them under sortal concepts) is a 
process at the level of conceptual thought. 
So 
5 The claim that perception presents us with particulars as potential objects of thought only 
with the aid of the conceptual capacity to classify them according to their kinds is false. 
[From 1, 2, 3, 4] 
But 
6 If perception is presenting you with o as a potential object of thought, you are in a 
position to appropriate o. [Assumption from the start of the section.] 
So 
7 Appropriation sortalism (the view that sortalism is true because the capacity to 
appropriate objects depends on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds) is 
false. [From 5, 6] 
 
 To consolidate the case against appropriation sortalism, it is useful to consider how 
the empirical evidence described in this section impacts on one traditional argument for 
sortalism: the argument from the claim that pointing is ambiguous. Philosophers advancing 
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this argument say that the referent of a demonstrative is fixed by a mental or physical act 
of pointing which singles out one object as salient. But, they say, mental or physical 
pointing can single out a determinate object only if accompanied by a specification of kind. 
If I just point without specifying a kind, there will be no boundaries around the spatio-
temporal part of the world I am pointing to. And in this case I cannot count as pointing at a 
unique object – there is nothing to make it the case that I am pointing at the chair across 
the room, rather than the arm of the chair, or the point on the chair’s arm that a line 
emerging from the end of my pointing finger would hit, or a momentary temporal stage of 
the chair, or the mereological sum of the chair and the table at which it is placed, or the bit 
of metal of which the chair is made (which may survive a change in which the chair itself 
is destroyed, or be destroyed by a change the chair survives). According to philosophers 
who advocate sortalism on the ground that unsupplemented pointing is ambiguous, the role 
of sortal concepts in enabling us to achieve demonstrative reference is to remove this 
ambiguity. These philosophers think of mental and physical pointing as having a two-part 
structure. First we indicate a direction. Then we provide a sortal concept to draw spatio-
temporal boundaries around a part of the world in that direction. The object pointed at is 
the object with these spatio-temporal boundaries.
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 The empirical evidence I have set out in this section undermines this traditional 
argument’s central premiss – the claim that conceptually unaided mental or physical 
pointing is ambiguous. For this evidence suggests that our pre-conceptual processing 
parses the visual field into visual objects. So it suggests that the boundaries that proponents 
of the traditional argument think sortal concepts draw are already there in the pre-
conceptual deliverances of our perceptual systems. And in that case, mental and physical 
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pointing do not have the two-part structure (indicate a general direction; provide a sortal 
concept to draw a boundary in that general direction) that proponents of the traditional 
sortalist argument supposed.  ‘Mental pointing’ is attending to a visual object. Physical 
pointing serves to direct attention to a visual object. When you attend to a visual object 
there is a fact of the matter about the spatio-temporal spread of your attention. For 
example, if you are attending just to the arm of the chair, you will be quick to notice 
changes occurring on the chair’s arm, and slow to notice changes on the chair’s leg. 
(Compare the ‘automatic spread of attention’ experiments: if you are attending just to the 
chair’s arm, the boundaries around the chair’s arm are functioning like the boundaries of 
the initially cued rectangle in one of these experiments. Your information processing 
favours the attended region, so you are quicker at picking up changes within it.) Similarly, 
it is only if you were attending to the piece of metal of which the chair was made, rather 
than to the chair itself, that you would be able to keep attending through a change that the 
piece of metal but not the chair survives. 
 So the empirical evidence suggests that both appropriation sortalism, and the 
central premiss in the traditional ‘pointing is ambiguous’ argument for sortalism, are false. 
Our pre-conceptual processing has already worked out where the boundaries around the 
objects we are pointing (or attending) to are before conceptual thought comes to the 
table.
12
  
 
§3 Rich Referential Sortalism is True 
Recall the rich definition of ‘refer’ from §1: S is using α to ‘refer to’ o (in a 
context) iff S’s intention, in using α’s in the context is at least to introduce o for the rest of 
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the sentence containing α to say something about.
 
‘Rich referential sortalism’ is the view 
that the capacity to refer in this rich sense depends on the capacity to classify. The 
argument for rich referential sortalism that I want to present goes like this. (For economy 
of expression, from now on I shall use ‘refer’ in the rich sense only unless otherwise 
stated.) 
 
1 To refer to an object you have to be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about it. 
 
2 To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object you have to be in a 
position to ascribe properties to it.  
 
3 Our capacities to ascribe properties to objects depend on our capacities to classify them.  
 
So 
 
4 Our capacities to refer to objects depend on our capacities to classify them. 
 
1 follows from the rich definition of ‘refer’. I take 2 to be analytic: to ‘say something 
about’ an object just is to ascribe a property to it
13
. The argument is valid. So to use the 
argument to establish its conclusion it remains to establish 3 – the claim about the sortal 
dependence of property ascription.  
 As it stands, 3 is ambiguous between a strong reading 
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3a The capacity to ascribe a property to o depends on knowledge which kind of thing o is. 
 
and a weak reading 
 
3b The capacity to ascribe a property to o depends on knowledge that o is a thing of some 
determinate kind, but not knowledge which kind this actually is. 
 
This ambiguity in 3 generates a corresponding ambiguity between strong and weak 
sortalist conclusions: 
 
4a (Strong sortalism) S can refer to o only if there is some kind κ such that S knows that o 
belongs to κ. 
 
4b (Weak sortalism) S can refer to o only if S knows that, for some kind κ, o belongs to κ. 
 
The argument for the sortal dependency of property ascription that I am going to present is 
an argument for 3b. So it contributes to establishing weak sortalism (4b), rather than strong 
sortalism (4a). I shall consider the importance of the distinction between strong and weak 
sortalism when I discuss the intuitive anti-sortalist objection in §4. 
 The argument for the sortal dependency of property ascription takes its rise from 
the need to solve an old puzzle about what constitutes a genuine property. The puzzle goes 
like this.  
 Suppose  
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Generosity about properties – for every predicate, Φ, there is a property F such that an 
object o satisfies Φ  iff o has F. 
 
This generous criterion entails that objects have many properties that we do not ordinarily 
consider. For example, it entails that at the time of writing I have not only the properties of 
being human and being 170 cm tall, but also the properties of being shorter than my 
younger brother, being such that George W. Bush is president of the United States, and 
being either 160cm tall or such that Toronto is the capital of Ontario. In addition, suppose 
 
Generosity about change – o changes between times t1 and t2 iff, for some property F, o 
has F at t1 but not at t2, or has F at t2 but not at t1. 
 
Generosity about change combines with generosity about properties to entail that objects 
undergo many more changes than we ordinarily think they do. For example, this 
combination entails that I changed when my younger brother grew taller than me (I 
acquired the property of being shorter than him) and I will change when George Bush 
ceases to be president (I will lose the property of being such that George Bush is 
president).  
 It is a terminological question whether to allow that the generous definitions are 
really defining legitimate notions of ‘property’ and ‘change’. But the examples show that 
the generous notions of ‘property’ and ‘change’ are not our ordinary notions. We 
ordinarily take it that being human and being 170 cm tall are ‘properties’ of objects in a 
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way that being such that George Bush is president is not. And we ordinarily take it that 
when George Bush ceases to be president or my brother grows taller than me they (not I) 
are the ones who change. So our ordinary notions of ‘property’ and ‘change’ are much 
more restricted than the generous notions. The old problem about what constitutes a 
genuine property (and a genuine change) is the problem of what to say about the status of 
this restriction: What, other than just the fact that intuition favours them, is so special about 
ordinary properties and ordinary change? 
 Philosophers’ attempts to answer this question have focussed on the connection 
between the notions of property, change, and cause
14
. Causal relations are generally taken 
to be relations between events. But they are relations that hold in virtue of the objects 
which participate in the related events and these objects’ properties. One event causes 
another iff the objects involved are such that a change in one object’s properties brings 
about a change in another’s. So, for example, X’s pulling of the trigger causes Y’s death in 
virtue of the fact that a change in one of X’s properties (the amount of pressure X is 
exerting on the trigger) brings about change in Y’s properties. Philosophers looking for an 
anchor for the favoured status of ordinary properties have pointed out the connection 
between the notions of cause, change, and property. And they have argued that only 
ordinary properties and ordinary change relate to causation in a way that respects this 
connection. So the suggestion is that, for example, my ceasing to be such that George Bush 
is president can never be causally relevant in the way that changes in ordinary properties 
are.  
 Of course, it would be open to define a notion of ‘generous causation’ which would 
count generous properties as causally relevant and generous changes as causes and effects. 
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The appeal to the connection between the notions of cause, change, and property to secure 
the status of ordinary properties owes its attractiveness to the fact that it seems much more 
obvious that ‘generous causation’ would not be real causation than it is that a generous 
property is not a real property, or a generous change not a real change. For we appeal to 
causal relations to explain why events in the world unfold the way they do. And a 
‘generous’ notion of causation would be a notion of causation without explanatory power. 
 There are many questions about how this connection between the ordinary notions 
of property and change and the notion of causation is to be made out. But I want to say just 
enough about the causal account of the status of ordinary properties to show how it entails 
the sortal dependency of property ascription. And all that is required for this purpose is the 
general claim that the special status we assign genuine properties rests on our taking it that 
an object’s genuine properties, and not its spurious properties, contribute to determining its 
causal path through the world.  
As a first step towards showing how this general claim generates the sortal 
dependency of property ascription, let us make it more precise. The causal implications, for 
an object, of possessing a property always depend on which other properties the object has. 
For example, a boulder’s being round entails that it will roll down a plane inclined at a 
given angle and with a given surface iff it is also heavy, rigid, and smooth enough to roll 
given the angle and surface of the plane (and has no other property which would stop it 
rolling under the circumstances). An artefact’s being made of iron entails that it will, 
usually, cut wood if it has a sharp edge (and is constructed strongly enough), that it will 
hold water if it has an appropriate shape, that it will dissolve in acid at a given rate, 
depending on its surface area, and so on. Possession of a property endows an object with 
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‘conditional causal powers’ – powers to behave in various ways in various circumstances, 
conditional on what its other properties are
15
. So the claim that a thing’s genuine properties 
are all and only its causally relevant properties can be precisified into  
 
The Causal Relevance Principle (hereafter ‘CRP’): F is a genuine property of object o iff 
possession of F endows o with some range of conditional causal powers. 
  
Note that the CRP is neutral between the (extreme) metaphysical claim that the nature of a 
genuine property is exhausted by the causal implications of possessing it
16
 and the (more 
moderate) metaphysical claim that a genuine property is what generates (or provides the 
‘categorical grounds’) for a cluster of causal implications
17
. The CRP is also neutral with 
respect to whether we must appeal to conditional causal powers to individuate genuine 
properties. The claim is only that the genuine properties endow objects with conditional 
causal powers. So, for example, it is consistent with the CRP to say that the property of 
being spherical is individuated purely geometrically (it is the property of having a volume 
determined by a specific equation), but that sphericality owes its status as a genuine 
property to the causal difference that it makes. 
 Now let us ask exactly how the notion of a conditional causal power must be 
understood if the CRP is to provide a solution to the problem about the status of ordinary 
properties.  
If the CRP is to provide a solution to this problem, the notion of ‘conditional causal 
power’ must be understood in such a way that spurious properties (like being fifty miles 
south of a burning barn and being such that George Bush is president) do not endow things 
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with any. So, for example, the following will not do as an elucidation of the notion of a 
conditional causal power: 
 
(CCP1) Possession of property F endows o with the power to X in situations of kind ∑ 
given that o also has other properties Γ iff, if o has F and Γ, it will X in a situation of kind 
∑. 
 
For consider the following statement:  
 
If o is such that George Bush is president, and o has the properties {being a boulder, being 
spherical, weighing 200kg} then if o is placed mid-way down a grassy slope o will roll to 
the bottom. 
 
This statement is true. And it combines with CCP1 to entail 
 
Possession of the property of being such that George Bush is president endows o with the 
power to roll to the bottom of a grassy slope if o also has properties {being a boulder, 
being spherical, weighing 200kg}. 
 
So, given CCP1 and the CRP, the property of being such that George Bush is president 
emerges as a genuine property.  
 The problem with CCP1 is obvious enough. The left hand side of CCP1, with its 
use of ‘endows’, treats whether o has F as making a difference to which powers o will 
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have, provided that it also has the properties in Γ. But this claim about making a difference 
has been stripped from CCP1’s right hand side. So CCP1 leaves out an essential part of the 
relation between possession of a genuine property and possession of conditional causal 
powers: the fact that possession of a genuine property makes a difference to which 
conditional causal powers an object has. 
 As a first step towards rectifying this problem, we might move from CCP1 to  
 
(CCP2) Possession of property F endows o with the power to X in situations of kind ∑ 
given other properties Γ iff, if o has F and Γ, it will X in a situation of kind ∑, and o will 
not X in this kind of situation given Γ alone. 
 
But CCP2 will not do either. For consider this claim:  
 
If Jack is such that George Bush is president, and Jack has the property of being able to 
discriminate person-sized objects against different coloured backgrounds at distances of up 
to 1000 feet,  then Jack will see the president if looking in the right direction in a situation 
where George Bush is 1000 feet away in appropriate lighting conditions; and if Jack lacks 
the property of being such that George Bush is president he will not see the president in 
this situation. 
 
This claim is true. And it combines with CCP2 to entail that the property of being such that 
George Bush is president does endow Jack with a conditional causal power. So, like CCP1, 
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CCP2 combines with the CRP to entail that being such that George Bush is president is a 
genuine property.  
 Again, it seems obvious enough what has gone wrong with CCP2. CCP2 fails to 
recognise that to count as endowing an object with a conditional causal power the 
possession of a property must make a difference to how the object would behave against a 
sufficiently varied range of background Γ’s and in a sufficiently varied range of ∑’s. So we 
need something like 
 
(CCP3) Possession of property F endows o with the power to X in situations of kind ∑ 
given Γ iff,  
(i) if o has F and Γ, o will X in a situation of kind ∑, and o will not X in this kind of 
situation given Γ alone, and  
(ii) for some Γ1,…,Γn some X1,…,Xn and some ∑1, …, ∑n, where the Γi, Xi, and ∑i are 
sufficiently varied, if o has F and Γi it will Xi iff introduced into a situation of kind ∑i and 
will not Xi in this kind of situation given Γi  alone. 
 
CCP3 captures the fact that to count as endowing an object with a conditional causal power 
possession of a property must make a difference to the object’s causal embedment in the 
world – to how the object will behave given a range of other properties and across a range 
of situations.  
 And now recall the various glosses philosophers have given on the notion of a 
‘sortal concept’. These include the following. κ is a sortal concept iff the questionHow 
many things falling under κ are there in such and such a region of the world? always has 
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a determinate answer
18
. κ is a sortal concept iff for all x, if x falls under κ no part of x also 
falls under κ
19
. κ is a sortal concept iff for all x, if x falls under κ the question ‘What is it?’, 
when asked with respect to x, may be answered by saying that x falls under κ
20
. κ is a 
sortal concept iff the fact that x is a κ determines which changes x can undergo without 
ceasing to exist
21
. κ is a sortal concept iff the things falling under κ share a characteristic 
kind of way of behaving
22
.  
 Lack of clarity about the relations between these various notions of sortal concept, 
and about which notion is at issue in any particular instance, is a long-standing source of 
confusion in the debate about sortalism. It is not possible to trace the various confusions, or 
clarify the relations between philosophers’ various notions of sortal concept here
23
. But the 
sortalist argument I am constructing does not require a detailed survey of this kind. It 
requires only an observation that we are now in a position to make: the observation that, 
given CCP3, the CRP entails that the conditional causal powers with which possession of a 
genuine property endows an object depend on the object’s sort in a sense of ‘sort’ 
coinciding with at least some of the glosses on ‘sortal concept’ that philosophers have 
given. CCP3 supposes that o instantiates some background pattern of causal embedment, 
and explains the causal implications, for o, of possessing F in terms of the difference 
between variations on that pattern – the variation that o will instantiate if it has F, and the 
variation it will instantiate if it does not. So CCP3 entails that the causal powers with 
which possession of F would endow o do not depend just on o’s other properties. They 
also depend on which background pattern of causal embedment o instantiates. But to give 
an object’s background pattern of causal embedment – an account of the ways it will 
behave given a variety of properties in a variety of situations – just is to give (one) answer 
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to the question ‘What is this object?’, and to give (one) classification of the object in terms 
of a characteristic way of behaving.
24
 So examination of the notion of a conditional causal 
power has led us to the conclusion that whether possession of a property endows an object 
with conditional causal powers, and which conditional causal powers these are, depends on 
the object’s kind.  
 This conclusion entails a special form of the sortal dependence of property 
ascription (claim 3 in the argument from the start of the section). Here is how. Let us say 
that a ‘genuine’ property ascription is an ascription to an object of a property that would 
endow the object with conditional causal powers if the object actually had it. (So ‘I am 
170cm tall’ is a genuine property ascription and ‘I am such that George Bush is president’ 
is not.) In addition, let us say that S ‘grasps a property ascription as genuine’ iff S knows 
that it is a genuine property ascription. And now let us ask what epistemic situation S must 
be in if S is to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine. 
 One possibility is that for some kind κ, S knows that o is a κ, and knows a range of 
the causal implications of possession of F for κ’s. In this case, S is in a position to grasp an 
ascription of F to o as genuine in virtue of knowing a specific range of conditional causal 
powers with which possession of F would endow o. 
 A second possibility is that, though not knowing o’s kind, S knows that there is 
some kind κ such that members of κ would be endowed with conditional causal powers by 
possession of F, and o is a κ. In this case, S is in a position to grasp an ascription of F to o 
as genuine in virtue of knowing that there is some range of conditional causal powers with 
which possession of F would endow o, though S does not know which range this is. 
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 But now suppose S neither knows, for some κ, that o is a κ, nor knows that there is 
some κ for which possession of F is causally significant such that o is a κ. Then S does not 
know any specific causal implications of F-ness for o, and S does not know that F-ness 
even has causal implications for o. And in that case S does not know that an ascription of F 
to o would be a genuine property ascription. For S does not know that possession of F 
would endow o with any conditional causal powers. (Suppose I know the following (and 
no more than the following) about sphericality. Sphericality is a property that endows o 
with the powers to roll down a smooth surface if o is a suitably heavy stone; bounce 
straight up when dropped on the floor if o is a ball made of suitably dense rubber; squash 
into this shape given that much pressure if o is a jelly. And suppose I do not know that o is 
a stone or a bouncy ball or a jelly. Then I do not know that possession of sphericality 
would endow o with any conditional causal powers.) 
 So to grasp an ascription of F to o as genuine, S must either know o’s kind, or 
know that o belongs to some range of kinds for which F-ness is causally significant. And 
that is the weak sortal dependence of property ascription for the special case of property 
ascriptions grasped as genuine.  
 To complete the argument for rich referential sortalism, it remains to show that 
claim 2 in the argument stated at the start of the section (the claim that to be in a position 
to say things, right or wrong, about an object you have to be in a position to ascribe 
properties to it) can be upgraded, for the case of things picked out perceptually, to  
 
2* To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object picked out perceptually 
you must be in a position to grasp some ascriptions of properties to the object as genuine.  
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But if the distinction between genuine and spurious properties is allowed its intuitive bite 
in the first place, it carries this upgrade with it. For the intuitive notion of a ‘genuine’ 
property – the notion we appealed to causal relevance to explain – is just the notion of a 
property that you would have to mention to give a complete account of what there is in the 
spatio-temporal world. The ‘genuine’ properties and changes are the properties and 
changes which would have to be included in a complete account of the history of the 
spatio-temporal world; the ‘spurious’ properties and changes could be omitted without loss 
of information because they are just superfluous constructions out of the properties spatio-
temporal things really have and the changes they really undergo. But we can pick out 
perceptually only objects that are apparently located in the space around us. So to suppose 
that 2* is false is to suppose that you could be in a position to understand claims about a 
spatio-temporal thing even though you had no grasp of any difference that the truth of any 
of these claims might make to a right account of the history of the spatio-temporal world.  
Putting together the pieces now on the table, the argument for rich referential 
sortalism that I want to propose goes like this: 
 
1 To refer to an object you have to be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about it. 
[The rich sense of ‘refer to’ from §1.] 
 
2* To be in a position to say things, right or wrong, about an object picked out 
perceptually, you have to be in a position to grasp some ascriptions of properties to the 
object as genuine.  
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3b* Grasp of some ascriptions of properties to o as genuine requires at least knowledge 
that, for some κ where possession of the property endows κ’s with conditional causal 
powers,  o is a κ.  
 
therefore 
 
4 S can refer to an object, o, picked out perceptually only if S knows that, for some kind κ, 
o belongs to κ
25
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 It is important to emphasize that the sense of ‘refer to’ in this argument is the rich 
sense from §1, and that the argument is (therefore) an argument for rich referential 
sortalism rather than appropriation sortalism. So it is consistent with 4 to allow that a 
subject may be in a position to introduce an object picked out perceptually as relevant to 
the conversation from his or her point of view without being in a position to ascribe 
properties grasped as genuine to the object, and without knowing that for some κ the object 
belongs to κ. In a case of this kind, the subject is in a position to ‘appropriate’ o (that is, 
‘refer to’ o in the minimal sense distinguished in §1), but not to ‘refer to’ o in the rich 
sense. And I take the argument from §2 to have established that in fact the capacity to 
appropriate perceived objects does not rest on the capacity to classify them. So I am 
allowing both of the following: 
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(i) A perceptual link with an object may put an ordinary adult subject in a position to 
introduce o as relevant to the conversation from his or her point of view even though he or 
she does not know that, for some kind κ, o is a κ. 
 
(ii) A subject who has yet to acquire, or has lost the capacity to ascribe predicates grasped 
as genuine may have the capacity to introduce a perceived object as relevant to the 
conversation from his or her point of view.  
 
§4 The objection to sortalism from examples where reference succeeds while 
classification fails 
So far in this paper I have distinguished two varieties of sortalism and argued that 
one (appropriation sortalism) is false, while the other (rich referential sortalism) is true. 
Now I want to consider how the version of sortalism I have proposed fares in the face of 
the obvious intuitive objection to any sortalist view: the objection from examples which 
seem to present clear cases of reference succeeding where classification fails. 
Here is a range of examples of this kind
26
. 
 
CASE 1 You stumble upon a thing of a kind you have not come across before. You have 
no idea where it might fit in your system of sortal classification – whether it is animal, 
vegetable, or mineral; whether it is an artefact or something that came to exist without 
human intervention. But it seems that you can refer to it, in the richer sense of ‘refer’: there 
it is, sitting on your desk, and you say ‘That is yellow; it is cubical; I wonder what it is’. 
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CASE 2 You are receiving a lot of perceptual information from a thing, and much of it is 
veridical. But, carelessly, you misapply your capacity to classify, and reach a wrong 
conclusion about the kind of thing it is. (You conclude that it is a person when actually it is 
a very life-like waxwork.) But it seems that you can refer (richly) to the thing: when you 
say ‘He’s standing inside the rope-line’, you seem to be ascribing a property to the thing 
you are mistaken about.  
 
CASE 3 You can see a thing moving around in the distance. It is too far away for you to 
tell what kind of thing it is. But it seems that you can refer (richly) to it (you and your 
friend might be wondering whether it is a bird, a plane, or superman, and trying to work 
out how fast it is actually moving.)  
 
CASE 4 Your attention has been caught by what seems to you to be an animal in the 
shadows. Actually there is no ordinary object there. The ‘thing’ (or ‘visual object’) that 
you are attending to is just a thickening in the pattern of light and dark. It seems that you 
are in a position to refer (richly) to the thing: otherwise you would not be in a position to 
speculate about its size and likely fierceness.  
 
The standard sortalist response to these examples has been to make a blanket 
appeal to the distinction between strong and weak versions of sortalism drawn at the start 
of §3. Philosophers making this response acknowledge that the examples do undermine 
strong sortalism:  
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If S can refer to o then, for some kind κ, S knows that o belongs to κ. 
 
But they contend that the examples do not undermine weak sortalism:  
 
If S can refer to o then S knows that, for some kind κ, o belongs to κ.  
 
Proponents of the standard response then claim that they are endorsing only weak 
sortalism, and that in each of cases 1 – 4, though the strong sortalist demand (for 
knowledge which kind o falls under) is not met, the weak sortalist demand (for knowledge 
that there is some kind that o falls under) is.
27
  
 At first sight, the argument for sortalism I have presented seems to provide an ideal 
set-up for this standard response. For the argument is an argument for weak sortalism. So 
the standard response – suggesting that the examples are not counterexamples to weak 
sortalism – looks like a natural move.  
However, I want to suggest that the standard response is a mistake. As a first 
indication why, consider the fact that, on the face of it, Cases 1-4 seem to be of quite 
different kinds. Cases 1 and 3 are cases of classification apparently withheld, rather than 
cases of misclassification. And they are cases in which you withhold classification for 
different reasons. In Case 1 you know a lot about the thing – all its observable properties 
are transparent to you – it is just that you cannot classify it because you cannot tell where it 
fits in your system of sortal classification. In Case 3 your inability to classify seems to 
trace to a quite different source – you cannot classify the thing because it is so far away 
that you cannot discern its basic observable properties (like colour, shape, texture, and 
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degree of solidity). Cases 2 and 4 are cases of misclassification, rather than classification 
withheld. But, again, they are cases in which classification seems to fail for very different 
reasons. In Case 4 you are hazarding a classification on the basis of sketchy information 
(the thing seems to have a shape, colour, and degree of solidity which it in fact lacks). In 
Case 2, your information about the thing is mostly veridical – you are right about many of 
the thing’s basic observable properties. And most of the time if you classify as a person a 
thing with these basic observable properties you will be right. It is just that in this situation 
your usually reliable method of classification goes awry. So cases 1 – 4 look, on the face of 
it, very different. But the standard sortalist response gives them a uniform treatment – it 
treats them all as cases in which you know that the thing falls under some kind without 
knowing which.  
 I suggest that the blanket appeal to weak sortalism in response to cases 1 – 4 
obscures the way the relation between demonstrative reference and sortal classification 
actually works. The rest of this section uses the argument for rich referential sortalism 
from §3 to develop an alternative treatment of the problem examples that sets this mistake 
right.  
 The alternative treatment is built around the role that argument of §3 assigns to the 
capacity to classify a thing in enabling a subject to refer to it demonstratively. According 
to this argument, the capacity to refer demonstratively depends on the capacity to classify 
because to refer to a thing demonstratively you need to be able to grasp ascriptions to the 
object of some properties as genuine; grasp of an ascription to o of F as genuine requires 
either knowing some of the specific conditional causal powers with which possession of F 
would endow o, or knowing that possession of F would endow o with some conditional 
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causal powers though you do not know which. The more specific type of knowledge 
requires knowing the object’s kind, and the less specific requires knowing that the object is 
a member of a kind for which F is causally significant.  
So the argument I have proposed generates criteria for drawing two distinctions 
between examples of apparent successful demonstrative reference without successful 
classification. 
The first is a criterion for the distinction between cases of successful reference and 
cases of reference failure. According to the argument I have proposed, your perceptual link 
with o puts you in a position to refer to o demonstratively only if it puts you in a position 
to know, for some range of properties, that possession of these properties would endow o 
with conditional causal powers.  
The second is a criterion for distinguishing cases in which you have knowledge of 
classification (cases where there is some κ such that you know that o belongs to κ) from 
cases in which you have mere knowledge of classifiability (cases where you know only 
that, for some κ, o belongs to κ). According to the argument I have proposed, you have 
knowledge of classification iff you know a range of specific causal implications with 
which possession of various properties would endow the object. You have mere knowledge 
of classifiability iff you know no specific causal implications, but know that the object 
belongs to a kind for which a specific range of properties is causally significant.  
Armed with these two criteria, let us consider each kind of problem example in 
turn.  
First consider examples like Case 1. In this kind of example, a thing’s observable 
properties are transparent to you, but you have no idea where to place it in your system of 
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sortal classification. The standard sortalist move has been to acknowledge that in this 
situation you do not know the thing’s kind, but argue that you do know that it is a thing of 
a kind. But if the argument for sortalism I have proposed is right, this application of the 
standard move is wrong. For in Case 1 there is a range, though a small one, of conditional 
causal powers with which you can tell that specific genuine properties endow things of o’s 
kind. Suppose you can see that the thing is cubical and yellow. You pick it up. It holds its 
shape under the pressure of your grip. You put it on the desk, where it sits, yellow and 
cubical. You can push it around with a finger. In this case, you know that the thing has the 
power to stay at rest on the ground, or on a flat wooden surface, given its observed colour, 
shape, and mass; the power to hold a constant shape and colour under the kind of pressure 
exerted by your grip and through a change in position; the power to slide across a flat 
wooden surface given a small push, and, again, given the shape, colour, mass, and degree 
of smoothness that you have observed it to have. In this kind of case, where the thing’s 
observable properties are transparent to you, you are watching a section of its causal 
history unfold in front of you. You can see its interactions with other objects. You can see 
how its properties are developing given external influences. So, for the properties you can 
see (or otherwise perceive) that the thing has, you know a basic range of conditional causal 
powers with which possession of these properties endows the thing.  In this case you do 
have specific knowledge which kind of thing you are dealing with: it is a thing of this kind, 
a thing which behaves in these ways given these properties and this stable situation.  
I shall call the kind knowledge you have when you are in this position ‘ostensive’ 
knowledge of kind.  
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Ostensive knowledge of kind can fill the role identified for knowledge of kind in 
the argument for sortalism that I have proposed. There are other roles, identified by other 
arguments for sortalism,that ostensive knowledge of kind cannot fill. For example, 
consider the traditional argument for sortalism from the alleged ambiguity of pointing 
sketched at the end of §2. According this argument, the job of sortal concepts in enabling 
demonstrative reference is to draw a boundary around a spatio-temporal region in a 
direction indicated by a mental or physical demonstration. So philosophers whose 
sortalism is motivated by this argument will think that knowledge of kind must be 
knowledge of something comprehensive enough to delineate a determinate spatio-temporal 
region. Similarly, some philosophers have suggested that knowledge of kind involves 
knowledge where the thing fits into a system of sortal classification, so that to know a 
thing’s kind you need to know which kinds of things count as more or less similar to it. But 
the argument for sortalism that I have proposed assigns no role to either of these more 
demanding forms of classificatory knowledge. So, from the point of view of the sortalist 
view I have proposed, the fact that ostensive knowledge of kind falls short of what some 
philosophers discussing sortalism have assumed knowledge of kind would involve is no 
objection: ostensive knowledge of kind is a type of knowledge of kind because it plays 
knowledge of kind’s role.  
Now consider Case 2. Here, as in Case 1, many of the thing’s observable properties 
are transparent to you. But in Case 2 you are making a wrong classification. You are 
thinking ‘That is a person’, when actually the thing you are attending to is a waxwork.  
I suggest that this case is actually a parallel to a familiar kind of situation involving 
‘knowledge which’ or ‘knowledge who’.  
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Suppose you and I are talking face to face, and I am under the misapprehension that 
you are the Secretary General of the United Nations. Then I know who you are ostensively 
(you are this person). I also have a false belief about who you are. This false belief will 
combine with my background beliefs to generate many other false beliefs, for example, the 
belief that you will be addressing the United Nations tomorrow; the belief that you 
orchestrated the deployment of a peacekeeping force to such-and-such country last year; 
and so on. But there is no reason to think that my false belief about who you are (that you 
are the Secretary General of the United Nations) undermines my true, ostensive, one (that 
you are this person).   
I suggest that Case 2 has just this structure. In Case 2, many of the observable 
properties of the thing you are attending to are transparent to you. So, just as in Case 1, you 
have ostensive knowledge what kind of thing it is. You also have a false belief about its 
kind: the belief that it is a person. So you believe both ‘That is of this kind’ and ‘That is a 
person’. And, because your beliefs about the causal implications of F-ness for a thing 
depend on your beliefs about its kind, your false belief about the thing’s kind carries with it 
false beliefs about some of the causal implications of F-ness for the thing.  But the mistake 
about kind, and your false beliefs about some of the causal implications of F-ness for the 
thing, do nothing to undermine the fact that a portion of the thing’s causal history is 
unfolding in front of you. Though you have many false beliefs about the causal 
implications of F-ness for the thing, you also have many true ones. So you still have 
ostensive knowledge of the thing’s kind. And this specific knowledge of kind is putting 
you in a position to refer. 
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Next consider Case 3 (the case of the thing visible only as a speck moving around 
in the distance). Suppose that the thing seems to be moving in the way characteristic of 
material objects (for example, tracing out a continuous spatiotemporal path). And suppose 
that whatever qualitative changes the thing seems to be undergoing are explicable in terms 
of a combination of changes in viewing conditions (maybe it is getting closer or farther 
away, or passing through a semi-opaque cloud or a shadow) and changes in a causally 
unified thing. In this case, you would be justified in believing that the thing is an ordinary 
material object. So if it actually is an ordinary material object (as opposed to just appearing 
to behave like one) you are in a position to know that it is. But the class of ordinary 
material objects just is the class of things for which we know observable properties to have 
causal implications. (It is doubtful that observable properties have causal implications for 
non-ordinary ‘things’ such as shadows, reflections, and mereological sums. But even if 
they do, knowledge that they do does not play a role in ordinary demonstrative reference, 
for we as ordinary speakers have no such knowledge.) So in this case you are in a position 
to know that, for some κ for which observable properties are causally significant, o is a κ. 
And here the move that the standard response to the problem examples insists on across the 
board is the right one: your capacity to refer to the thing is secured by the fact that you 
know that it is classifiable, though you are not in fact in a position to classify it. 
Because this is where my treatment of the supposed counterexamples to sortalism 
lies closest to the standard response, I shall take a little time to set out the differences 
between the standard response and my own appeal to weak sortalism. There are three main 
points of comparison.  
 36 
 The first is just the point about uniform treatment of apparently diverse examples 
that I have already made. The standard response to the problem examples appeals to weak 
sortalism across the board. I have appealed to weak sortalism in only one kind of case. 
The second point of comparison concerns the fit between the appeal to weak 
sortalism and the argument used to establish sortalism in the first place. The argument for 
sortalism that I have presented both identifies a role for knowledge of specific 
classification when we have it, and entails that we can refer with mere knowledge of 
classifiability. From the point of view of this argument, the ready availability of examples 
where reference succeeds given only knowledge of classifiability, not knowledge of 
classification, is an indication that we are on the right track. In contrast, the standard extant 
arguments for sortalism seem, at first sight, to support strong sortalist conclusions. For 
example, consider again the argument from the alleged ambiguity of pointing. According 
to a proponent of this argument, a subject referring to a thing demonstratively needs to 
supply a sortal concept to determine where the spatio-temporal boundaries of the 
demonstrated object lie. But this job of delineating a demonstrated object seems to require 
a specific sortal classification – if pointing is ambiguous, pointing and saying ‘the thing of 
some kind in that direction’ will be ambiguous too. So when this traditional argument for 
sortalism is combined with the standard response to Cases 1- 4 the result just looks ad hoc 
– it looks like the sortalist is stepping back to a position weaker than the position 
demanded by the argument used to support sortalism in the first place.   
 The third point of comparison between the appeal to weak sortalism that I am 
suggesting and the blanket appeal made by the proponent of the standard response 
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concerns the need to provide an account of what knowledge of classifiability without 
knowledge of kind consists in.  
Proponents of the standard response have tended to gesture towards the notions of 
‘approximation to’ or ‘homing in on’ a kind to fill this role
28
. But this gesture just does not 
seem to fit the problem examples. There is no sortal concept that you are homing in on 
when you switch back and forth among the ‘bird, plane, Superman’ hypotheses. When you 
say ‘I have no idea what this is’ you may really have no idea. And it seems that you can get 
a thing’s sort wildly wrong (for example, mistaking a waxwork for a person) while still 
managing to refer to it.
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The argument for sortalism I have proposed generates an account of knowledge of 
classificability without knowledge of classification that has nothing to do with 
‘approximation’ or ‘homing in’. Given this argument, knowledge of classifiability without 
specific knowledge of kind is knowledge that the appropriated object falls under some kind 
for which you know, for some specific properties, that these properties are causally 
significant.  
 Finally, consider examples like Case 4 (where you mistake a thickening in the 
shadows for a dog). In this kind of case, you have a perceptual link with a thing (you are 
attending to a visual object). But your perceptual link does not put you in a position to 
know, for any F, a range of conditional causal powers with which being F would endow 
the thing. And it does not put you in a position to know, for any F, that the thing belongs to 
a kind for which F-ness is causally significant. So the view I have proposed treats this as a 
case of reference failure.  
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 It may seem that to diagnose reference failure in Case 4 is to concede that here we 
have a counterexample to the sortalist view I have proposed. For someone might argue like 
this. ‘Ordinary speaker intuition wants to treat Case 4 as a case of successful reference. So 
an account of the conditions for reference which entails that reference fails in Case 4 does 
not capture how our ordinary practices of referring and ascribing reference work. Case 4 
shows that we can refer when we lack both specific knowledge of classification and 
knowledge of classifiability. So it shows that the sortalist view proposed in this paper 
cannot be right.’ 
 But how clear is it, really, that ordinary speaker intuition wants to treat Case 4 as a 
case of successful reference?  Here are two ways that a conversation in a Case 4 situation 
might go: 
 
Me – ‘That is a dog’  
You (having got in a position where you can see better)  – ‘No, it’s a shadow’. 
 
Me – ‘That is a dog’ 
You (having got in a position where you can see better) – ‘No, there’s nothing there’. 
 
In the first exchange you seem to be treating me as referring to a thing (a shadow) that I 
then misclassify. In the second you seem to be treating me as failing to refer.   
Given that both exchanges are coherent, it seems that ordinary speaker intuition 
does not produce a consistent result with respect to whether cases like Case 4 involve 
successful reference.  So these examples raise a challenge that an account of how 
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demonstrative reference works should be able to meet: to explain, in terms of the 
conditions for successful demonstrative reference, why ordinary speaker intuition should 
deliver conflicting results about this kind of case. 
And once this challenge has been recognised, Case 4 emerges as raising just as 
much of a problem for anti-sortalists as it does for sortalists. For each kind of view 
generates a univocal verdict with respect to Case 4 examples. The view I have proposed 
entails that they involve reference failure. And an anti-sortalist seems to be stuck treating 
them as cases where reference succeeds. So, given that ordinary speaker intuition delivers 
conflicting results, anyone proposing either view has work to do to explain why the 
conflict arises. 
This is the hard problem about the relationship between reference and classification 
that remains when the foundations for the new approach to sortalism I am advocating are 
in place. And it arises for sortalist and anti-sortalist alike. 
It is not possible to provide a full discussion of this hard problem here. So I shall 
not try to. Instead I shall close with a sketch of the kind of solution to the problem that the 
view I have proposed generates.  
 The solution is most easily brought out by way of a parallel with an example 
involving ‘I’. Suppose that the colleague in the next room has set up his or her computer to 
say ‘I’m finished’ in a human-sounding voice whenever it completes a task. You do not 
know this. One day you are talking with this colleague in your office and a token of ‘I’m 
finished’ rings loud and clear through the open doors. You say to your colleague ‘He’s 
finished’. Your colleague says ‘Oh, there’s nobody there – it’s just my computer’.  
 Now consider the reference-fixing rule for ‘I’: 
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A token of ‘I’ refers to the agent who produces it. 
 
Given this rule, the computer-generated token of ‘I’ does not refer. But it does appropriate. 
It appropriates the object that produces it. It is because this object does not meet an extra 
condition required by the reference-fixing rule (that the referent be an agent) that the token 
does not refer. And note that, even though the token of ‘I’ in the example does not refer, it 
serves as the antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun that does (‘it’ in ‘it’s just my computer’). 
So an indexical that merely appropriates an object can serve as the antecedent to an 
anaphoric pronoun that refers to it. 
 I want to suggest that Case 4 (where my attention has been caught by a thickening 
in the shadows) should be understood in this same way. When I say ‘That is a dog’, my use 
of ‘that’ appropriates the visual object I am attending to. I believe that F-ness would have 
one set of causal implications for the object (the causal implications that F-ness has for a 
dog). Actually, the causal implications of F-ness for the object that my use of ‘that’ 
appropriates would be very different. So I am not in a position to grasp ascriptions of 
genuine properties to the thing appropriated by my use of ‘That’. So, given the argument of 
§3, this is a case of appropriation without reference. But an anaphoric pronoun can refer 
even though its antecedent merely appropriates (just as in the case of computer-generated 
‘I’). When you say ‘No, it’s just a shadow’, your use of ‘it’ refers to the thing that you are 
in a position to refer to though I was not. The alternative response, ‘No, it’s nothing’ is the 
parallel to ‘It’s nobody’ in the ‘I’ case: a response that acknowledges that the initial 
demonstrative does not refer to the object it appropriates.
 *
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1
 The rich definition’s pedigree includes Quine (see for example, (1960): 141-42, 177); 
Frege (I take it that the context principle (1950): 116 requires something like the rich 
definition); Evans (the rich definition is entailed by Evans’s ‘Generality Constraint’ 
(1982): 100-105 and the importance he attaches to it); and many others.  
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2
 Compare Kripke (1977): 262-264.  
 
3
 See Siegel and Glanzberg (2007): 1. 
 
4
 Note that a rich referring use introduces o as relevant to the proposition S intends to 
communicate, rather than the proposition ‘strictly and literally expressed’ by S’s utterance. 
This is in keeping with the fact that distinction I have drawn between ‘rich’ and ‘minimal’ 
reference is a distinction between senses of ‘speaker’s reference’. See note 2 and 
accompanying text. 
 
5
 The argument of this section parallels the argument of Campbell (2006): 226-31, though 
Campbell does not distinguish the conditions for reference from those for appropriation, 
and thinks the argument establishes the falsity of sortalism about reference, not just the 
falsity of appropriation sortalism. 
 
6
 The evidence I cite is all ‘behavioural’ evidence for the object-directedness of attention. 
A separate group of studies have found neurophysiological evidence for this conclusion. 
Attention to one attribute of an object automatically entails ‘enhanced processing’ (which 
can be detected by measuring electrical activity in the brain) of other attributes of the same 
object, with task-irrelevant attributes of an attended object selected along with task 
relevant attributes (so if you ask someone to keep track of a thing’s shape the processing 
devoted to its colour, size, etc. is also enhanced). Sameness of location on its own does not 
generate this kind of enhancement. This suggests that attention is being held by the object, 
rather than the location. See O’Craven, Downing, and Kanwisher (1999). 
 
7
 For references to automatic spread of attention experiments see Scholl (2002): 8-9. For a 
textbook account see Palmer (1999): 547-48. 
 
8
 See Driver et al. (2002): 76-79. For a textbook account of amodal completion results see 
Palmer (1999): 293-294, 554-555. 
 
9
 See for example Palmer (1999): 554. 
 
10
 For accounts of multiple object tracking experiments see Pylyshyn (2003): 223-27 and 
(2007): 34-58; Scholl (2002): 9-10 and (2007): 49-78. 
 
11
 For this kind of argument for sortalism see, for example, Quine (1953): 67-68. 
Wiggins’s (1997) claim that a subject can count as keeping track of a single object through 
motion and change only in virtue of keeping track of the object as a thing of some kind is a 
variant of this same ‘pointing is ambiguous’ line of thought adapted to the case of 
temporally extended pointing. Dummett (1973): 179, 233-234, 570-577, 582-583 and 
(1981): 218 and Strawson (1959): 180-213 both endorse two-stage (pointing indicates a 
general location; a sortal concept delineates the boundaries of an object in the location 
indicated) accounts of demonstrative reference-fixing.  
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12
 Note that to deny the traditional two-stage account of mental or physical pointing 
(pointing indicates a direction; sortal concepts draw boundaries around an object in that 
direction) is not to deny that sortal concepts may sometimes have a role to play in 
achieving determinate pointing. For it may be that sortal concepts sometimes play a role in 
orienting attention towards one rather than another visual object. Both the arm and the 
whole chair are there to attend to. One rather than another may be rendered salient by some 
cue (as in the automatic spread of attention and multiple object tracking experiments). If 
there is no such cue, a sortal concept might be needed to draw attention to a specific visual 
object. This suggestion is developed in Campbell (2002): 61-83.  
 
13
 This would be denied by philosophers who think that you can ‘say something about’ an 
object just by saying that it exists, and that existence is not a property. I take the argument 
for 2* at the end of this section to show that possible exceptions to 2 generated by this 
view do not undermine the argument for rich referential sortalism.  
 
14
 For canonical statements of the problem, and of this kind of solution, see Shoemaker 
(2003a) and (2003b). 
 
15
 This is Shoemaker’s term. See Shoemaker (2003a): 213. 
 
16
 This is Shoemaker’s view. See, for example, Shoemaker (2003a): 213. 
 
17
 For defence of this view see Campbell (2002): 235-54. 
 
18
 Frege (1950): 65-7. Wiggins raises a doubt about this claim (2001): 74. 
 
19
 Frege (1950): 65-7. 
 
20
 Wiggins (2001): 21, 56. 
 
21
 Wiggins (2001): 70. 
 
22
 Wiggins (2001): 72, 77-106.  
 
23
 See Grandy (2007) for a recent discussion of the various definitions of ‘sortal concept’ 
and the relations between them. 
 
24
 The first part of this line of thought parallels Shoemaker’s claim about the need for a 
‘baseline’ of stable behaviour against which the notion of endowment with a power may be 
explained. (Compare Shoemaker (2003a): 254: ‘In order to be able to specify the effects on 
a thing of various kinds of external influences, we need to be able to specify, as our 
baseline, the sort of history the thing would have if not subjected to these influences’.) But 
rather than looking to the notion of a characteristic pattern of behaviour to provide this 
baseline, Shoemaker claims that it is to be provided by a kind of essential inertia that he 
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supposes bundles of properties to have: ‘…it is typically built into the nature of a property 
that in the absence of external influences (or of a change in external influences) a thing 
having that property will continue to have it’ (Shoemaker (2003b): 254). But, though it is 
not possible to argue for this point properly here, Shoemaker’s notion of inertia among 
bundles of properties cannot provide the kind of ‘baseline’ that the notion of a conditional 
causal power requires. For an object’s properties just do not have the kind of stability that 
Shoemaker is supposing. I discuss this point in a little more detail in Dickie (2010): 527-
528. 
 
25
 A full discussion would bring out the connections between the sortalist proposal I have 
advanced in this section, the role of sortal classification in enabling us to reidentify objects 
after breaks in observation, and the developmental psychology literature on acquisition of 
the capacity to reidentify (see Xu (2007) for a summary). But it is not practicable to 
develop these connections here. 
 
26
 For examples like this in the anti-sortalist literature, see Ayers (1974), (1997); Campbell 
(2006). 
 
27
 See, for example, Wiggins (2001): 218; Evans (1982): 178. 
 
28
 For example, here is Wiggins:  ‘…for a thinker to single out or individuate a substance, 
[x] there needs to be something about his rapport with x or his relational state towards x 
and his practical sensibility in relation to x, which … sufficiently approximates to this: the 
thinker’s singling out x as x and as a thing of a kind f such that membership in f entails 
some correct answer to the question “what is x?”’ (Wiggins (2001): 7). And compare 
Evans (1982): 178-179. 
 
29
 Compare Campbell (2002): 72-73, (2006): 221-26. 
 
*
 Thanks to John Campbell, Susanna Siegel, and an anonymous referee for this journal for 
comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Hakwan Lau for discussion of the empirical material 
in §2. Thanks also to the Philosophy Department at New York University where this paper 
was completed during my time as a Bersoff Faculty Research Fellow.  
